How Far Can Copyright Be Stretched? - Framing the Debate on Whether New and Different Forms of Creativity Can Be Protected by Bonadio, E. & Lucchi, N.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Bonadio, E. and Lucchi, N. (2019). How Far Can Copyright Be Stretched? - 
Framing the Debate on Whether New and Different Forms of Creativity Can Be Protected. 
Intellectual Property Quarterly, 2, pp. 115-135. 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/21828/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
 1 
How Far Can Copyright Be Stretched?  
Framing the Debate on Whether New and Different Forms of Creativity Can Be Protected 
  
Enrico Bonadio & Nicola Lucchi* 
 
Enrico Bonadio 
Senior Lecturer, City Law School University of London, UK 
 
Nicola Lucchi 
Associate Professor, Jönköping International Business School, Sweden 
 
Abstract: This paper expands on whether copyright protection may be available for certain 
new and non-conventional works as diverse as graffiti, sports movements, dj-sets, culinary 
presentations, jokes, magic tricks, works created by artificial intelligence and engineered DNA. 
The potential expansion of copyright in a knowledge-based society is a relevant and topical 
subject at the moment also in light of the current scholarly and policy debates on the 
modernisation of copyright rules in many countries, including the EU and US. The issue of 
whether copyright can protect certain new and non-traditional products of human ingenuity is 
here addressed by carrying out a specific-work-related analysis of core tenets of copyright laws, 
including copyrightable subject matter, originality, fixation and authorship requirements, 
functionality exception, morality, and public policy provisions. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on whether new spaces for copyright protection of certain new and non-
traditional works can be drawn. Creative people and organizations are indeed unceasingly 
coming up with new forms of artistic and cultural expression, being often difficult to predict 
the specific shape the relevant outputs will take. Since its conception copyright laws have been 
constantly evolving to keep up with new developments and advances, and it is thus useful to 
understand how these regimes can interact with new and to some extent unconventional forms 
of human creativity. 
It is not just art, music and culture that are evolving and challenging the traditional principles 
and comfortable contours of copyright laws. Recent technological developments are also 
playing a role. Take synthetic biology, bioengineering, and artificial intelligence techniques, 
that are increasingly helping to address some of today’s most pressing industrial, technological 
and biomedical challenges; and that are producing outputs that might soon be recognised as 
meriting copyright protection. It could be argued that this is just ‘history repeating’.1 Copyright 
                                               
* Both authors contributed equally to this article and are listed alphabetically. 
1 Justin Hughes, A Short History of "Intellectual Property" in Relation to Copyright, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1293, 
1324 (2012). 
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laws have always needed to adapt to and catch up with new technologies and their societal 
consequences; this occurred for example with the advent of photography, motion pictures, 
computer programs, and several other “new” works.2 
In this paper, we thus puzzle over whether in a world characterized by fast social and 
technological changes copyright laws are too obsessed with categorization of works and a rigid 
application of the requirements for protection and other copyright rules. The aim is to open up 
a discussion about whether we could imagine a more open and flexible copyright system and 
accommodate the interests of an increasingly broad category of creators by guaranteeing them 
protection.3  
The categories of new and non-conventional works we take here into consideration are varied 
and include graffiti art, sports movements, dj-sets, culinary presentations, jokes, magic tricks, 
artificial intelligence (AI) and engineered DNA. These topics seem to be of great and topical 
interest not only to the circles of IP scholars, but also to policy-makers, especially in a period 
where the debate on copyright and digital content reforms is intensifying in Europe and 
internationally.4 At EU level, the significance and importance of the subject is reflected in the 
priorities of the EU “Digital Agenda for Europe”5 as well as in the current jurisprudence and recent 
cases at the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”).6 
The issue of whether copyright can protect certain new and non-traditional products of human 
ingenuity is here addressed by carrying out a specific-work-related analysis of core tenets of 
copyright laws, including copyrightable subject matter, originality, fixation and authorship 
requirements, functionality exception and morality and public policy provisions. The article 
proceeds as follows: after Section II briefly expands on the theories which inform and justify 
copyright protection, Section III offers a preliminary analysis of the distinction between closed 
lists and open lists of copyrightable subject matter; Part IV and V discuss the originality and 
                                               
2 See also Brad Sherman and Leanne Wiseman (eds), Copyright and the Challenge of the New 1 (2012) (noting 
that “one of the most challenging things about copyright law is that it is constantly subject to change”). 
3 Some scholars have already speculated about whether some non-traditional works could be protected by 
copyright. See for example R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next Great Copyright Act,” 
29 Berkely Tech. L.J. 1489 (2014); Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 78 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 17 (2016); Christopher Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1229 
(2016). 
4 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the Modernisation of EU 
Copyright Rules, 136, SWD (2016) 301 final PART 1/3 (Sept. 14, 2016); European Copyright Society, General 
Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package (January 24, 2017), 5, 
https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs-opinion-on-eu-copyright-reform-
def.pdf.  
5 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM (2010) 245 final/2 
(Aug. 26, 2010). 
6 See e.g. C-310/17 Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 
November 2018, ECLI:EU:C 2018, 899 
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fixation requirements; Part VI then focuses on the issues surrounding the functionality 
exception; Part VII addresses the authorship requirement; and finally Part VIII examines public 
policy considerations such as the idea-expression dichotomy.  
The focus of the article is on works and forms of expression which have recently attracted 
attention amongst courts and scholars. The subjects have been selected with the purpose of 
identifying trends and highlighting possible commonalities and differences in the progressive 
expansion of the range of protectable works. We have focused on topics that have had or may 
have an impact on case law or policy. In providing direct and concise insight into a new area 
of copyright-related research, the selection of topics for comment and analysis may appear 
uneven or occasionally idiosyncratic. In order to overcome this limit, such a selection follows 
a deliberate pattern: we have tried to identify topics that are capable of stimulating the academic 
discussion and the contamination of legal approaches amongst different legal systems, with the 
aim of promoting exchanges and dialogues between legislators, judges and legal scholars. 
 
II. Justifying copyright … and expanding its boundaries as well? 
 
Before addressing the issue of whether new and non-conventional works can be eligible for 
copyright protection, we first need to analyze the historical rationale behind copyright 
protection as well as the applicability of traditional principles of copyright to such creations. 
Copyright was introduced three centuries ago, first in the UK, in response to the advent and 
rapid evolution of printing technology.7 It is nowadays a tool aimed to prevent works from 
being copied, communicated and distributed.8 Past and present experience demonstrates that 
the creation of literary, artistic and scientific works plays an essential role, not only in 
developing culture but also in spurring economic growth:9 indeed, economists suggest that the 
accumulation of knowledge is the driving force behind economic advancement.10 
 
Countries with common law traditions - in particular the US - view copyright as a way to 
encourage the creation of works: this is the utilitarian and incentive-focused function of this 
intellectual property right, based on the belief that people need the lure of strong monopolistic 
                                               
7  See amongst many Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and 
Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe 27-29, 36 (1979); Gillian Davies, Copyright and the Public 
Interest 14 (2d ed. 2002). 
8 See e.g Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (1968); Daniel Burkitt, Copyrighting Culture: 
The History and Cultural Specificity of the Western Model of Copyright, 2 Intell. Prop. Q. 146 
(2001); Christopher May, The Venetian Moment: New Technologies, Legal Innovation and the Institutional 
Origins of Intellectual Property, 20 Prometheus 159 (2002). 
9 See Kamil Idris, International Intellectual Property: Introduction, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 209, 210 (2003). 
10 See Paul Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 1002 (1986). 
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rights to come up with new creations, as without such prospect “the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts” would not be promoted (as stressed in Art. I, § 8, of the US Constitution).11 Yet, 
although accepted by several scholars and commentators, the belief that copyright stimulates 
new creations is also often empirically questioned, especially when it comes to the experience 
of early career artists and creators. An interesting book by Professor Jessica Silbey,12 for 
example, challenged the conventional wisdom related to defining the utilitarian function of 
copyright: highlighting the interviews she had with as diverse creators as musicians, 
filmmakers, writers, painters, sculptors, photographers, web designers and software engineers, 
Professor Silbey realised that what pushes people to create often is not the hope to get copyright 
or other intellectual property rights, but the pursuit of personal and professional pleasure and 
freedom within communities of influence.13 
Thus, taking into account the (non-copyright-related) motivations which often push creators to 
come up with new works, it may be more tempting to justify copyright by invoking aspects 
related to authors’ ingenuity and personality. These approaches, often linked to well-known 
theories developed by the philosophers John Locke (the labor theory of property14 as well as 
the knowledge theory15)  and Friedrich Hegel (personality theory of property),16 are adopted in 
civil law jurisdictions, such as France, Germany, Spain and Italy, which grant artists, writers 
and creators in general exclusive rights because the protected works constitute the fruits of 
                                               
11 For a debate on whether copyright can be or not considered a monopoly in the ordinary sense of the word or 
rather a merely right to prevent others from copying, see e.g. Catherine Seville, Literary Copyright Reform in 
Early Victorian England: The Framing of the 1842 Copyright Act 28,30 (1999) (examining copyright antagonists’ 
view that copyright is a monopoly). 
12 Jessica Silbey, The Eureka Myth – Creators, Innovators, and Everyday Intellectual Property, Stanford 
University Press (2014)). 
13 See Silbey, The Eureka Myth, supra note 12, at 53. For an even more critical view of intellectual property 
regimes, including copyright, see Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly 5 (2008) 
(arguing that “intellectual property is an unnecessary evil” and “a residual of the middle ages”). 
14 See John Locke, The Second Treatise on Government (1690) §§ 25-51, 123-26 (noting that “Though the earth, 
and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body 
has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property)”. 
15 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) 
(1690) (examining the nature of knowledge and the ability of men to analyze and understand it). In post-industrial 
society, information and knowledge are indeed considered as the crucial elements: “[w]hen knowledge becomes 
involved in some systematic form in the applied transformation of resources (through invention or social design), 
then one can say that knowledge, not labour, is the source of value.” See Daniel Bell, The Social Framework of 
the Information Society, in The Microelectronics Revolution: The Complete Guide to the New Technology and 
its Impact on Society 500, 506. (T. Forester ed. 1980). 
16 See Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right, book first published in 1821.  
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their personal efforts17 and reflect their persona.18 Basically, the painting, the poem, the musical 
work, represent who the author or artist is, to the extent that a work belongs to its creator 
because the idea is a manifestation of the creator’s personality or self.19 The wording used in 
civil law countries to define this intellectual property right speaks volumes: not copyright, or 
the right to copy, but “author’s law”: Urheberrecht in German, droit d’auteur in French, 
derecho de autor in Spanish, diritto d’autore in Italian and direito de autor in Portuguese. 
Approaches that justify copyright based on authors’ labor or personality theories, or even on 
natural and human rights’ theories (which shares similarities with the former as they also focus 
on the relationship between a human being and his/her creation),20 seem more capable of 
expanding the boundaries of the copyrightable subject matter. Indeed, copyright systems based 
on such theories can protect creativity “from potential attacks by an utilitarian analysis that 
would recognize property only contingently insofar as it furthers society’s goals of … wealth 
maximization”;21 and offer arguments “that property, in general, and intellectual property, 
specifically, must be recognized by a just state, regardless of efficiency considerations”.22 That 
would inevitably open the door to, and welcome into the realm of copyright, new and non-
conventional works that might instead be excluded by regimes based mainly on utilitarian 
principles. 
Indeed, while many creative communities mentioned in this article do operate without any 
economic incentive, artists and authors therein may often cherish the idea of just their persona, 
honour or reputation being protected. In other words, they may be interested in what moral 
                                               
17 Lockean justifications have also sometimes been invoked in the US. For example, in 1984 the US Supreme 
Court cited John Locke’s labor theory of property when finding that intangible products of an individual’s labor 
and invention can be property: see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L. J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (citing Ruckelshaus 
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03 (1984)). 
18 In his book Philosophy of Right, Hegel made the point that that intellectual creations are an extension of the 
author’s personality, self and will and should, therefore, be accorded property rights. The personality theory of 
property was more recently further developed by law scholar Professor Margaret Radin in her article “Property 
and Personhood”, published in the Stanford Law Review, 34 (1982), 957-1015 (noting that there are some kinds 
of things in which we invest so much time and energy and to which we become so attached that we see ourselves 
reflected in them”). 
19 See also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property. 77 Geo. L.J. 287 (1988), pp. 306 and 330 (also 
noting that “it is possible to treat the value-added theory as a normative proposition: people should be rewarded 
for how much value they add to other people’s lives, regardless of whether they are motivated by such rewards”). 
20 On a human and natural right focused theory of intellectual property, see Janewa Osei Tutu, Corporate ’Human 
Rights’ to Intellectual Property Protection, Santa Clara Law Review, 2015, Vol. 55 p. 129 (contextualising the 
natural rights of creators within the broader frameworks of human rights law). See also Andreas Rahmatian, 
Copyright and Creativity: The Making of Property Rights in Creative Works 5 (2011) (focusing on the well-
known ‘Romantic author’ critique as a sophisticated justification for copyright protection). See also Peter K. Yu, 
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1039, 
1081-83 (2007); Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, I.P.Q. 349 (1999) (critically focusing on 
the categorization of IP rights within the broader set of human rights). 
21 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 453 (2006) 
(expanding in particular on the Hegelian personality theory). 
22 Ibidem. 
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rights in most jurisdictions offer, including the rights of paternity and integrity, which - as is 
known - aim at safeguarding the personal sphere of artists and authors. Here, self-regulatory 
mechanisms normally used in these communities (so-called “social norms”) may often not 
adequately satisfy the interests of creators. That is why an attraction of new and non-traditional 
works under the copyright umbrella may do justice to the intellectual efforts and passion many 
artists and authors put in the creative process of producing works. 
New and non-conventional creators may even become interested in some forms of economic 
reward, especially after their works is appropriated by someone else for profit purposes (an 
economic reward that evidently could be secured by invoking copyright). Such interest in, and 
reliance on, copyright would come after the relevant work is created and even more after it is 
misused by third parties for economic reasons, which excludes here any relevance of the 
utilitarian theory.   
But even where the incentive-based theory of copyright is fully accepted, it could still be argued 
that many new and non-traditional creators mentioned in this article (e.g. graffiti, sports 
movements, dj-sets, culinary presentations, jokes, magic tricks, works created by artificial 
intelligence and engineered DNA) could be attracted by copyright regimes, especially if 
authors and artists are properly educated about how this intellectual property right could help 
them in extracting value out of their outputs.23 Thus - for example - granting copyright 
protection to graffiti or tattoos can help to support the development of character merchandising 
markets and public performances or displays or other uses of these forms of art. Likewise, chefs 
may benefit from copyright in their food presentations as the latter would allow them to extract 
profits, for instance from the publication of cookbooks incorporating images of their creations. 
The same is true of magicians, who may start nurturing interests in using their tricks in recorded 
performances to be then included in DVDs or other supports.  If such artists and authors are 
fully aware of what copyright can bring them in terms of economic benefits and of its very 
nature and aim (for example, a legal tool which can help to make a living), their approach 
towards this intellectual property right may become more welcoming. 
                                               
23 See generally Enrico Bonadio – Nicola Lucchi, Non-Conventional Copyright – Do New and Atypical Works 
Deserve Protection? (Elgar 2018). See also Xiyin Tang, Copyright in the Expanded Field, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 945 
(2014); Celia Lerman, Protecting Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and Copyright Law, 2 NYU J. Intell. Prop. & Ent. 
L. 295, 316 (2013); Janna Brancolini, Abracadabra! - Why Copyright Protection For Magic Is Not Just An 
Illusion, 33 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 103 (2013); Loren J. Weber, Something in the Way She Moves: the Case for 
Applying Copyright Protection to Sports Moves, 23 COLUMBIA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS 317-361 
(2000); Charles Cronin, Genius in a Bottle: Perfume, Copyright, and Human Perception, 56 J. Copyright Soc'y 
U.S.A., 427 (2009). 
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Economic motivations could also soon push biotechnology entrepreneurs to possibly look at 
copyright regimes to recoup the (often huge) investments needed in this field.24 It is true that 
legal scholars have initially criticized an expansion of copyright so as to include DNA 
sequences into the subject matter based on the fact that the economic rationale can be 
considered not sufficiently strong.25 Yet, such expansion may now be seen as less questionable, 
particularly in light of the current status and uncertain future of gene patenting after the (quite 
restrictive) US Supreme Court decisions reforming the patentable subject matter doctrine.26 
Similarly, one may note that copyright should not be available for AI-created works as 
economic incentives are here not necessary to stimulate machines to generate musical, 
literature or artistic outputs since machine themselves have to pay no bills. Yet, the argument 
that such works should be left in the public domain27 would end up paying no justice to who 
has invested financial resources to develop this highly creative technology. 
After wondering whether new and non-traditional works should be protected by copyright (and 
briefly commenting on the possible changing attitude of creative people and entities vis-a’-vis 
this right), the article will now address the issue of whether such creations can actually attract 
that protection. In particular, it will start by analysing whether new and non-traditional works 
could be included into copyrightable subject matter and be capable of meeting the requirements 
for protection.  
 
III. Subject Matter Categorization 
 
A first obstacle for new and non-traditional works to be protected comes from the rigid 
categorisation chosen by several copyright laws.28 One of these is the UK Copyright Act, which 
                                               
24 See e.g. Christopher M. Holman, Charting the Contours of a Copyright Regime Optimized for Engineered 
Genetic Code, 69 Okla. L. Rev. 399 (2017); ID, Developments in synthetic biology are altering the IP imperatives 
of biotechnology, 17 Vand. J. Ent. Tech. L. 385 (2015); Andrew W. Torrance, Synthesizing Law for Synthetic 
Biology, 11 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 629 (2010); Id., DNA Copyright, 46 Val. U. L. Rev. 1 (2011); Michael D. 
Murray, Post-Myriad Genetics Copyright of Synthetic Biology and Living Media, 10 Okla. J. L. & Tech. 71 
(2014); David Walker, Patent Protection or Copyright for Nucleic Acid Sequences? 36 The Licensing Journal 1 
(2016); R. Neethu, Rekindling the debate on genetic copyright in Europe in the era of biobanks and synthetic 
biology, 40 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 172, 176 (2018). 
25 See for example Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, supra note 2, at 83 
(noting that “copyright protection to DNA sequences seems unlikely to aid the formation of markets for the 
reproduction and distribution of copies, the making of copyrightable derivative works, or public performances or 
displays of DNA sequences”). 
26 See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Association for 
Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 186 L. Ed. 2d. 124 (2013) and Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank International 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (reversing more than 30 years of case law and questioning the 
enforceability and validity of patents on naturally occurring genetic material). 
27 See Amir H. Khoury, Intellectual Property Rights for “Hubots”: On the Legal Implications of Human-Like 
Robots as Innovators and Creators, 35 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 635 (2017). 
28 On such categorisation see Tanya Aplin, Subject Matter, in Research Handbook on The Future of EU Copyright, 
49, 67 (Estelle Derclaye, ed., 2009) (considering the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches). 
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has a closed list approach granting protection to only eight categories of works, namely literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic works, films, sound recordings, broadcasts, and typographical 
arrangements of published editions.29 Only works which happen to be within these available 
boxes are protected, thus creating what can be labelled as a ‘pigeon-hole’ system.30 While this 
regime may be praised for providing legal certainty, criticisms are also voiced. First, closed list 
systems may leave several works unprotected, as confirmed by the British cases Lucasfilm v 
Ainsworth31 and Creations Records v. News Group Newspapers .32 While in Lucasfilm it was 
held that the helmets of the Stormtrooper soldiers from the Star Wars films were not artistic 
works, in Creation Records it was found that no copyright subsists in a specially prepared scene 
(consisting of a white Rolls Royce in a swimming pool of a hotel and an arrangement of other 
objects and props), as this scene could not be categorised as a dramatic work or as an artistic 
work, or sculpture, collage or work of artistic craftsmanship. These decisions were criticised. 
For example, it was suggested that the outcome in Creations Records would create an 
unjustifiable discrimination, and in particular offend public policy, as the intellectual and 
manual efforts used to come up with the scene (the ensemble of object and props was 
photographed, and the official picture was used as a cover for an LP album of the band Oasis) 
reflected a significant amount of creativity which would deserve protection.33 
Categorisation is not completely rigid, though. Take laws like the 1790 US Copyright Act34 
which granted protection only to a very few works such as books, charts and maps;35 or the UK 
Statute of Anne of 1710 which covered just books. Both laws featured closed lists of 
copyrightable works, which have however expanded over time, through both the introduction 
of new subject matter into copyright laws36 and a (broad) interpretation of existing categories 
by judges and copyright offices.37 It has also been argued that current closed systems like the 
                                               
29 Other common law jurisdictions such as Australia and New Zealand have also adopted a closed list system.  
30 Tanya Aplin & Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 76 (2nd ed. 2013)) 
31 Lucasfilm Limited and others v Ainsworth and another [2011] UKSC 39 (U.K.). 
32 Creation Records v News Group Newspapers [1997] EMLR 444 (U.K.) 
33 See Andrew Christie, A Proposal for Simplifying United Kingdom Copyright Law, 23 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 
26 (2001). 
34 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1909). 
35 See e.g. Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. Copyright Soc’y 109, 116 (1991). 
36 In the US for example, after the 1790 Act, the copyrightable subject matter was expanded by the Congress by 
adding engravings, etchings, and prints in 1802, then musical compositions in 1831 and dramatic compositions in 
1856, photographs in 1865, paintings, drawings and statuary in 1870, motion pictures in 1912, and sound 
recordings in 1971; see Christopher J. Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 
1238, 1242 (2016).  
37 For example, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 US 53 (1884), the US Supreme Court upheld 
the power of Congress to extend copyright protection to photography, by holding that photographs could be 
considered as “writings” pursuant to Section 1(8) of the US Constitution (comparing them to engravings, etchings 
and prints), and noting that they embodied “the intellectual conception of the author”. Later, in Edison v Lubin, 
122 F. 240 (3d Cir. 1903) the concept of photographs was interpreted extensively to encompass films as they were 
considered as moving pictures. Also, under the 1909 Act the US copyright office registered computer programs 
as “books”, considering them as “how to do it” books; see R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in 
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1988 UK Copyright Act might be interpreted as encompassing new forms of creative 
expressions not explicitly mentioned in the eight categories.38 Indeed, following the Infopaq 
decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)39 (and even after the UK leaves 
the EU), the UK Copyright Act might be read to reflect the EU principle that anything that 
constitutes an ‘intellectual creation’ should be protected, and accordingly the fact that a work 
does not fall within those eight categories would not exclude protection.40 
While the rigidity of closed list systems may still be tempered by lawmakers’ interventions or 
judicial interpretation – because the existing categories can actually operate in an open-ended 
manner41 – jurisdictions that have adopted open and illustrative lists of copyrightable works, 
such as France, Germany and Netherlands, at least in theory should leave the ‘copyright door’ 
more open to new and non-traditional works. For example, it is probably also due to the fact 
that the Dutch copyright act contains an open list that the Supreme Court in the Netherlands 
found that the scent of a perfume can be eligible for protection..42 An open list approach would, 
therefore, have the advantage of injecting greater flexibility into the system and aim at 
guaranteeing comprehensiveness of protection; and new works will not be denied protection 
merely because they do not fall within any category of the list.43 What the US Congress noted 
when passing the 1976 Act and justifying the open list of protectable works it includes, is quite 
eloquent and relevant here: “[a]uthors are continually finding new ways of expressing 
themselves, but is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will 
take”.44 
                                               
the ‘Next Great Copyright Copyright Act , supra note 1, at 1519. And in the UK “printed sheet music” was 
considered as included in the sub-category of books in Bach v Longman (1777) 98 Eng Rep. 1274, 1275 (K.B.). 
38 See Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law 60-61 (4th Ed., 2014). 
39 Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R I-6569 (setting out the EU 
originality standard for copyright protection). 
40 See the UK case SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd [2013] EWHC 69 (Ch), [27]. At the time of 
writing it cannot be ruled out that the UK, even after leaving the EU, will still need to observe several laws 
governing the EU single market, including copyright-related directives and CJEU decisions. And even in case of 
departure of the UK from EU single market rules, the ‘intellectual creation’ test for copyright subsistence might 
still be kept by British courts. 
41 Tanya Aplin, Copyright in the Digital Society: The Challenges of Multimedia 249 (2005). See also the recent 
decision of the English High Court in Banner Universal Motion Pictures Ltd v Endemol Shine Group Ltd & Anor 
[2017] EWHC 2600 (Ch), which suggests that the format of a TV game show or quiz show can be protected by 
copyright as a dramatic work. 
42 See Kekofa BV Lancome Parfums et Beauté et Cie SNC [2006] ECDR 26. 
43 See Tanya Aplin, Subject Matter, in Research Handbook on The Future of EU Copyright, 49 (Estelle Derclaye, 
ed., 2009). An extensive and non-exhaustive list of works is also provided by Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention 
(Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 99-27, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979) (hereinafter also: Berne Convention), which clarifies that the expression 
“literary and artistic works” includes “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain”. 
44 1976 House Report No. 94-1476, at 51 (also noting that “[t]he history of copyright law has been one of gradual 
expansion in the types of works accorded protection … The historic expansion of copyright has also applied to 
forms of expression which, although in existence for generation or centuries, have only gradually come to be 
recognized as creative and worthy of protection”). 
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Yet, the propensity for ‘categorisation’ has remained even in countries that have adopted open 
list systems. In the US, for instance, new works like computer programs and video games were 
considered copyrightable since they had been deemed as falling within already identified 
categories of subject matter (literary and/or audiovisual works),45 and not because they had 
been treated as original works of authorship belonging to a new category.46 That categories of 
copyrightable subject matter remain relevant in the US copyright system has led some 
commentators to argue that the list provided by the act is effectively a closed one.47 Also, grey 
areas surrounding the scope and width of these categories remain. Take the lack of definition 
of choreographic works and pantomimes within the current US copyright Act; and the 
ambiguity such lack has created in relation to, for example, the protectability of sports moves 
as choreographic works and of magicians’ performances of tricks as pantomime.48 The state of 
uncertainty created by such grey areas is epitomized by the ‘rule of doubt’ certificates 
occasionally issued by the US copyright office in relation to unconventional subject matter. 
These certificates show the office’s skepticism about the copyrightability of a certain work but 
give applicant an opportunity to convince courts that the claimed subject matter is indeed 
protectable.  
All in all, as we have seen, whether jurisdictions provide for ‘pigeon-hole’ and closed list 
systems or not may not make a big difference in many circumstances – with some non-
traditional forms of creativity possibly getting copyright protection anyway. 
 
IV. Originality 
 
Falling within the copyrightable subject matter is not enough. Whether or not forms of 
creativity can be protected also depends on whether the work meets a sufficient level of 
originality. Although the Berne Convention does not explicitly state that copyrightable works 
must be ‘original’, most countries do provide so.49 The originality test varies across 
jurisdictions, ranging from the US law ‘minimal degree of creativity’ test (as affirmed in 
                                               
45 The definition of “computer program”, for instance, was added in 1980 by the US Congress to 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
This legislative intervention, and a court decision in Apple v. Franklin in 1983, clarified that the Copyright Act 
treated computer programs as literary works. 
46 See Aplin, Copyright in the Digital Society, supra note 32. 
47 See, e.g., Antony R. Reese, What should copyright protect? In What if We Could Reimagine Copyright? 111, 
128-29 (R. Giblin and K. Weatherall eds. 2017); Xiyin Tang, Copyright in the Expanded Field, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 
945 (2014) (analyzing the question of copyright protection for land art). See also (again) the 1976 House Report 
No. 94-1476, at 51, stressing that the 1976 US Copyright Act does not aim to “allow unlimited expansion into 
areas completely outside the present congressional intent”. 
48 See R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next Great Copyright Act, supra note 1, at 1526.  
49 See Elizabeth F. Judge and Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and Constellations: Comparing Notions of Originality in 
Copyright Law 27 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 375, 399 (2009) (comparing the application of originality standards in 
different jurisdictions). 
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Feist v. Rural)50 to the EU ‘intellectual creation’ requirement51 and the UK ‘skill, labour and 
judgment’ test.52 Despite such differences, the originality threshold has traditionally been low 
in many countries.53  
Requiring that copyrightable works simply be authors’ intellectual creations or the result of 
minimum level of creativity may make the categorization of eligible subject matter less 
relevant. The CJEU decisions which affirmed the copyrightability of works such as 11-words 
extracts from protected newspapers,54 a user interface in a computer program,55 or simple 
portrait photographs,56 seem to confirm it. In light of such case law - as mentioned above - it 
could be argued that where there is an intellectual creation, it is unnecessary to further 
categorise it as a particular type of work in order to consider it copyrightable. Whereas these 
findings may not particularly affect those EU countries that have an open-ended list approach, 
it may instead push jurisdictions like UK (even after Brexit)57 to expressly drop their closed 
list system and link the concept of work to originality.58 This would not really come as a big 
surprise as also the travaux préparatoires for the (Berne Convention) Brussels Revision 
Conference of 194859 indicated that the requirement of ‘intellectual creation’ is implicit in the 
concept of “literary and artistic work”.60 
Against this backdrop, we now consider whether various non-conventional works are capable 
of satisfying originality tests in several jurisdictions. We give here examples of forms of 
creativity as diverse as graffiti artworks, sports moves, dj-sets and food presentations. 
Graffiti artists – known within their subculture as ‘writers’–61 paint names and letters on 
various urban surfaces, such as tube and railway trains as well as walls. While most graffiti 
artworks which display highly creative and intricate forms of writing are certainly original, one 
                                               
50 Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
51 Infopaq v Danske, C-5/08, supra note 30. In this case, the CJEU found that anything that constitutes an 
intellectual creation should be protected by copyright. 
52 On the impact of Infopaq on the original UK ‘skill, labour and judgment’ test see Andreas Rahmatian, 
Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old ‘Skill and Labour’ Doctrine Under Pressure’ (2013) IIC - 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp 4–34. 
53 See for example Eleonora Rosati, Originality in EU Copyright: Full Harmonization through Case Law 169 
(2013) (noting how - under the German and other continental European countries’ copyright law - the originality 
requirement is based on a relaxed threshold). 
54 See again Infopaq v Danske, C-5/08, supra note 30. 
55 See Case C-393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace –Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury, 2010 
E.C.R. I-13971. 
56 See Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard Verlags, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533, 
57 See Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, supra note 29. 
58 On the CJEU case law suggesting that the notion of “originality” and “work” conflate see Eleonora Rosati, 
Originality in EU Copyright, supra note 30. 
59 Brussels Revision, done on June 26, 1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 217. 
60 Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention 
and Beyond § 8.03 (2006). 
61 See e.g. Walter J. Ong, Subway Graffiti and the Design of the Self, in The State of Language 400, 401 
(Christopher Ricks and Leonard Michaels ed. UC Berkeley Press, 1990) (noting that Graffiti artists refer to 
themselves not as artists or painters but as ‘writers’). 
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may note that the so-called “tags” lack a sufficient level of originality, and in general are too 
trivial to attract copyright protection. What are tags? They are basically street signatures and 
are often executed in condensed calligraphic form (yet, they are often considered by members 
of the general public to be mere scrawling which visually pollute our cities). 
It seems there is an increasing interest within graffiti communities in protecting tags and other 
writers’ signatures. For example, when taking legal action against McDonald’s and their 
attempt to capitalise on graffiti lettering, the partner of the deceased graffiti artist Dash Snow 
tried to rely on copyright to stop the food chain giant to commercially exploit the artist’s bubble 
style letters,62 and also registered the work with the US Copyright Office.63 
So, can tags be considered original for copyright purposes? If originality is assessed by people 
inside the graffiti subculture, it is likely that many tags may be deemed original. Indeed, graffiti 
writers continuously develop and perfect their own lettering style: a style which derives from 
countless hours of perfecting the image, even if the final image may appear to members of the 
general public less than perfect.64 Even tags which to an untrained eye and outside the graffiti 
scene happen to seem as banal, meaningless and always similar may be considered sufficiently 
original instead. And in copyright law originality should be assessed taking into account a 
specialised audience,65 which in this case would be the graffiti communities whose members 
are able to distinguish and appreciate differences and peculiarities, what people outside these 
circles and without knowledge of subcultural artistic processes cannot do. 
Also, the support on which tags are inserted and viewed (for example, a shop shutter or a 
rubbish bin) may influence the assessment of their originality. Instinctively, and perhaps 
wrongly, one may be more inclined to recognize the same graffiti signature as being artistic if 
she sees it on a canvas or a print. Yet, such assessment would be biased as it would be based 
on a prejudice, namely that only certain objects can be the support of artistic outputs. This is 
not correct also taking into consideration that the medium on which works are placed is not 
conclusive for the purposes of copyright subsistence. 
Sports moves may also be relevant here. One may think about the American basketball player 
Bob Cousy’s behind-the-back pass in basketball; or the German figure skater Werner 
Rittberger’s loop jump in ice skating.66 Could these moves be protected, for example as 
                                               
62 Jade Berreau v McDonald’s Corporation, complaint filed on 3 October 2016 at the US District Court Central 
District of California, Western Division. The legal action, however, was not successful on procedural grounds. 
63 Registration No VAu001269764, filed on 17 September 2016. 
64 Mark Halsey & Alison Young, “Our Desires Are Ungovernable”: Writing Graffiti in Urban Space, 10 
Theoretical Criminology 275, 294 (2006). 
65 Marta Iljadica, Copyright Beyond Law – Regulating Creativity in the Graffiti Subculture 152 (2016). 
66 Péter Mezei, Copyright Protection of Sport Moves, in Non-Conventional Copyright – Do New and Atypical 
Works Deserve Protection 271 (E. Bonadio and N. Lucchi eds. 2018). 
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choreographic works, where substantial creativity exists on the athletes’ and their trainers’ 
side? Recent scholarly work has gradually become more open to accepting the idea of 
choreographies in aesthetic or routine-oriented sports, like figure skating, synchronized 
swimming or wrestling, potentially satisfying the threshold of originality.67 In particular, these 
sports are characterized by an elevated level of freedom for athletes to express their creativity 
and personality and thus to ‘create’ sports moves or the combination thereof that might meet 
the originality requirement. Some scholars have interestingly noted that “[a]thletic routines 
exhibit composite creativity”,68 where individual elements of the choreography—like the 
different (and compulsory) elements (jumps, spins, creative skate-work), the selection of 
music, costume, make-up—may not warrant copyright protection on their own, yet the creative 
combination of these elements may surpass the level of originality and thus should be protected 
as a choreographed piece or dramatic production.69 
What about dj-sets? They can be defined as sequences of musical tracks mixed together to look 
like a unique continuous track.70 They are performed using a mixer and multiple sounds 
sources, such as turntables spinning vinyls, CD players or computer sound cards. 
It cannot be denied that disk jockeys often display genuine artistic creativity in compiling and 
executing the set and that their compilations can be considered original. Here the issue is 
whether play lists created by disk jockeys, either at parties or for radio stations, may be 
protected by copyright as original selections and arrangements of songs. In a recent British 
case, the dance record label Ministry of Sound launched a legal action against the streaming 
service Spotify claiming that playlists distributed on the music streaming service had copied 
its compilation albums. Spotify argued that Ministry had substantially overestimated the 
creative process behind creating its music compilations and that the concepts were simple and 
banal themes.71 The case was eventually settled out-of-court. But it does not seem heretic to 
argue that a dj-set would constitute a collection of works protectable for example under the EU 
Database Directive, which accord copyright protection to “databases which, by reason of the 
selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation”.72 
                                               
67 See e.g. Wm. Tucker Griffith & Ekaterina Godeeva, Beyond the Perfect Score: Protecting Routine- Oriented 
Athletic Performance with Copyright Law , 30 Connecticut L. Rev. 675 (1998); Loren J. Weber, Something in 
the Way She Moves: the Case for Applying Copyright Protection to Sports Moves, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts  
317, 361 (2000); Alexander Bussey, Stretching Copyright to its Limits: on the Copyrightability of Yoga and Other 
Sports Movements in Light of the U.S. Copyright Office’s New Characterization of Compilations, 20 Jeffrey S. 
Moorad Sports L. J. 1, 33 (2013). 
68 Wm. Tucker Griffith & Ekaterina Godeeva, supra note 43, at 713. 
69 Id. at 713-714. 
70 Tony Fernandez, No Matter What Kind of DJ You Are, Mixing Fundamentals Remain Valuable, DJ Times 
(April 5, 2016) at https://djtimes.com/no-matter-kind-dj-mixing-fundamentals-remain-valuable/ 
71 HC13C03860 Ministry of Sound Group Ltd et al. v Spotify Ltd (2014). 
72 See Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
legal protection of databases. 
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The originality requirement would probably be met if, through the selection or arrangement, 
the disk jockey expresses his or her creative ability in an original manner by making free and 
creative choices. After all, nobody can doubt about the creative skills of many disk jockeys: as 
has been correctly noted, why otherwise would major venues and events pay super-star disk 
jockeys six-figure sums to work the decks to thousands of adoring fans?73 
Culinary presentations are another interesting example of non-traditional form of creativity. 
Again, nobody can deny that chefs put effort and creativity in creating and coming up with (not 
only tasty, but also) eye-catching and somehow artistic dishes. Yet, food creations may have 
difficulty in meeting the originality standard because of the strong sharing ethos among chefs. 
Indeed, chefs often borrow elements from colleagues’ presentations,74 with many culinary 
creations today being simply based on or inspired by previous dishes and therefore not really 
capable of being considered independently created.75 A case that addressed the issue whether 
culinary presentations can be considered original for copyright purposes is the US dispute Kim 
Seng Company v. J&A Importers.76 It was held that a traditional bowl of Asian noodles topped 
with egg rolls, grilled meat, and other garnishes (basically, a combination of a common bowl 
with the contents of a common Asian dish) was routine and therefore not original.77 The judge 
found in particular that “regardless of which angle, quantity, or positioning of the various food 
items [the plaintiff] utilized, the unprotectable nature of the ingredients indicates a lack of 
originality”.78 
Thus, whether or not works of the kind we are taking into account here should be considered 
original for copyright purposes may often depend on specific circumstances, to be assessed 
carefully by judges if litigations arise. 
 
V. Fixation 
 
As copyright protects just expressions of ideas, and not ideas themselves, in several 
jurisdictions copyrightable works need to be fixed in a tangible medium.79 Indeed, despite the 
Berne Convention protects “literary and artistic works…, whatever may be the mode or form 
                                               
73 See Tom Iverson, Original Compilations of Musical Works: Can DJ Sets Be Protected by Copyright?, in Non-
Conventional Copyright – Do New and Atypical Works Deserve Protection 201 (E. Bonadio and N. Lucchi eds. 
2018). 
74 Cathay Y. N. Smith, Food Art: Protecting “Food Presentation” Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 14 J. 
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 2 (2014). 
75 Id. 
76 Kim Seng Company v. J&A Importers, Inc. 810 F. Supp.2d 1046, 1053-54 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  
77 See Cathay Y. N. Smith, supra note 50. 
78 Id. at 1053.  
79 See also Megan M. Carpenter, If it’s Broke, Fix It: Fixing Fixation 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 355 (noting that 
fixation “is often the judicial threshold over which idea becomes expression”). 
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of its expression”,80 it also allows countries to determine that works are ineligible for protection 
“unless they have been fixed in some material form.”81 The fixation requirement is thus 
allowed by Berne – and while copyright laws such as the US and UK statutes have incorporated 
it, others have not (this is the case of several civil law jurisdictions).82 
That said, what should be verified is whether certain copyright regimes are too obsessed with 
the tangible and physical embodiment requirement, especially when it comes to new art forms. 
More particularly, do contemporary copyright laws remain very much focused and dependent 
on a specific concept of medium purity?83 Are these laws still focused, for example, on a kind 
of traditional art which is just displayed in museums and dependent on judges’ subjective 
aesthetic judgments about what can be considered “artistic”,84 with the result that many pieces 
of contemporary art may be excluded from protection? 
Interesting cases have highlighted how a rigid application of the fixation requirement may 
leave new forms of art without protection. In the US case Kelley v Chicago Park District85 it 
was held that the garden Windflower Works - an important example of landscape art devised 
by Chapman Kelley - lacked the kind of stable fixation normally required to support copyright: 
“a garden is simply too changeable to satisfy the primary purpose of fixation; its appearance is 
too inherently variable to supply a baseline for determining questions of copyright 
protection”.86 A not very different outcome occurred in the British case Merchandising 
Corporation of America v Harpbond,87 where it was found that the facial make-up of the pop 
artist Adam Ant did not constitute a painting for the purpose of copyright (“if the marks are 
taken off the face there cannot be a painting. … a painting without a surface is not a painting”). 
This finding attracted criticism.88 It has been noted that it is difficult to see why a pop star’s 
face is less of a surface than a piece of canvas, and could not be protected by copyright.89 
Subsequent UK case law, however, was less strict and seemed to have made the transient or 
                                               
80 Berne Convention, Article 2, Sec. 1. 
81 See Berne Convention, art. 2(2) (“It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to 
prescribe that works in general or any specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been 
fixed in some material form.”).  
83 See Xiyin Tang, Copyright in the Expanded Field, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 945, 948 (2014). 
83 See Xiyin Tang, Copyright in the Expanded Field, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 945, 948 (2014). 
84 See Anne Barron, Copyright Law and the Claims of Art, 4 Intell. Prop. Q. 368, 371 (2002). 
85 Kelley v Chicago Park District 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011). 
86 Id. 
87 Merchandising Corp. of America Inc. & ors v. Harpbond Ltd & ors [1983] FSR 32. 
88 See also Anne Barron, Copyright Art and Objecthood, in Dear Images: Art Copyright and Culture, 277, 293, 
304 (Daniel McLean and Karsten Schubert, eds., 2002) (noting that art practices nowadays are often based on 
“the dematerialization of the art object: the production of art that yielded no object; or in which process, context-
dependence, chance or randomness [are] prioritised over form”).   
89 See Bently and Sherman, supra note 29, at 73-74. In the US make-up designs have been considered as satisfying 
the fixation requirement, instead: see Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding 
that makeup designs for the characters in the Broadway show “Cats” were copyrightable).  
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permanent fixation of the work on a surface a less important issue. In Metix v G.H. Maughan90, 
for instance, it was suggested that an ice sculpture, although obviously not permanent, should 
in principle be protected as a three-dimensional work made by an artist’s hand.91 What Metix 
entails is that not just a permanent materialization, but also an ephemeral fixation, of the 
tangible medium would suffice for copyright subsistence purposes. 
Also, what about graffiti artworks painted in the street? Most of them are ephemeral as they 
disappear relatively promptly. They may be removed from the owner of the property upon 
which they are placed; they may be painted over by local councils that want to keep clean the 
neighbourhood; or they may end up being vandalized. These artworks may also deteriorate and 
eventually vanish just because of the passing of time and weather elements. Could the transient 
nature of this form of art be an obstacle that prevents its copyright protection? Most probably 
no. For example, under US law the fixation requirement only demands that the work is 
“sufficiently permanent or stable” in order to allow it “to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration”.92 Although street and 
graffiti artworks may not last for a long time, their temporary existence – even for a few hours 
– appears to be sufficient to satisfy this requirement.93  
The same reasoning could be applied to food preparations. The decision in the above-
mentioned case Kim Seng Company v. J&A Importers94 – which held the bowl of perishable 
food as lacking fixation because once the food is eaten, it is basically gone – has been criticised. 
As has been noted, “copyright protection does not degrade in conjunction with the degradation 
of its subject works”;95 and that even if an artwork is destroyed after being created, it should 
still be considered as protected by copyright and not as fallen into the public domain merely 
because the physical embodiment is destroyed.96  
More problematic issues of fixation have recently arisen in relation to a more esoteric matter, 
namely the taste of a cheese. In the recent Levola case the CJEU held that said taste cannot be 
protected by copyright because it is not identifiable with sufficient precision and objectivity97 
                                               
90 Metix (UK) Ltd v G.H. Maughan (Plastics) [1997] FSR 718. 
91 See also Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, supra note 29. 
92 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides that a work is fixed when its embodiment “is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit 
it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 
93 See Cathay Y. N. Smith, Copyright in Culinary Presentation, in Non-Conventional Copyright – Do New and 
Atypical Works Deserve Protection 128 (E. Bonadio and N. Lucchi eds. 2018) (making a similar point in relation 
to food creations, and noting that such creations are fixed for a period more than a transitory duration when they 
are first made).  
94 Kim Seng Co. v. J&A Importers, Inc., 810 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
95 See Megan Carpenter, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Fixing Fixation, 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts, 355, 360 (2016). 
96 See Cathay Y. N. Smith, supra note 81. 
97 See C-310/17 Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 November 
2018, ECLI:EU:C 2018, 899. For an early comment of this decision, see e.g. Léon Dijkman, CJEU rules that taste 
of a food product is not protectable by copyright, 14 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Practice 85 (2019). 
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(the court did not explicitly mention the fixation requirement, but such a finding may inevitably 
be interpreted as introducing a harmonised de facto fixation condition).98 In doing so, the Court 
followed the opinion of the Advocate General Melchior Whatelet that – after arguing that 
originality is necessary but not sufficient for copyright protection – noted that the fact that 
tastes are ephemeral, volatile and unstable prevents them from being precisely and objectively 
identified and thus considered copyrightable works.99 In particular, the Court held that “Unlike, 
for example, a literary, pictorial, cinematographic or musical work, which is a precise and 
objective expression, the taste of a food product will be identified essentially on the basis of 
taste sensations and experiences, which are subjective and variable”.100 The court also noted 
that the only categories of works included in the definition given by the Berne Convention 
(“every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain”)101 are those that can be 
perceived through sight or hearing, but not other senses such as taste, smell or tactile sense.102 
In addition, it stressed that – given the difficulty of capturing the evanescent and fleeting 
character of taste as well as its very subjective experience – a defined and neutral identification 
of a taste is almost impossible. The main argument that the mere creation of a distinctive taste 
lacks legal certainty seems quite convincing. This decision might call into question the 
copyrightability of other subject matter such as scents, although this has been objected in light 
of the fact that it would be easier to digitally render smells.103 After all, that smells are eligible 
for copyright protection has already been acknowledged by the Dutch Supreme Court decision 
in the Lancôme case.104 It should also be noted that in Levola the Advocate General did not 
seem to rule out the possibility that copyright law might develop in the future when new 
techniques will be able to offer a precise and objective identification of the object of 
protection.105 Also, the very same Court noted that the reason why the taste of cheese is neither 
precise nor objective derives from the current state of scientific development.106  
                                               
98 See Caterina Sganga, The Notion of ‘Work’ in EU Copyright Law after Levola Hengelo: One Answer Given, 
Three Question Marks Ahead (2019) European Intellectual Property Review. . 
99 See Levola Hengelo (Case C-310/17), Opinion of 25 July 2018, para. 60. From the above comment, it seems 
clear that a fixation-related issue has been raised, although the Advocate General took the pain to stress that EU 
copyright law does not provide a fixation requirement (para 59).  
100 See C-310/17 Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV, supra note 98, para. 42. 
101 See again Article 2(1) Berne Convention.  
102 See C-310/17 Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV, supra note 96, para 39. 
103 Dijkman, above note 98, p. 86.   
104 See Kekofa BV Lancome Parfums et Beauté et Cie SNC [2006] ECDR 26. This is however a position not 
shared by the French Supreme Court, which denied that scents can attract copyright: see Cour de Cassation, 
Chambre civile 1, 13 June 2006 - Case No. 02-44.718; and Cour de cassation (Commercial Chamber) 10 
December 2013 – Case No. 11-19.872. 
105 See para. 57 of his Opinion (noting that “Je n’exclus pas qu’à l’avenir les techniques pour l’identification 
précise et objective d’une saveur ou d’une odeur puissent évoluer, ce qui pourrait amener le législateur à intervenir 
et les protéger au titre du droit d’auteur ou par d’autres moyens”). 
106 See para. 43 od the decision. 
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A rigid application of the fixation requirement may also leave unprotected traditional forms of 
artistic works. Music, for example, could be affected. This would be the case of jazz 
performers, especially when they come up with arrangements directly on stage and do not 
record their improvised performances.107 The same is true of comedians as their performances 
may depend in large part on audience interaction, such as responding to heckles from an 
audience member, reading subtle cues, and adapting a pre-planned routine as the performance 
goes on: with the result that, if comedians fail to fix their joke, they cannot rely on copyright 
protection.108 It could then be argued that these artistic outcomes challenge the paradigm of 
copyright laws that are predominantly based on the primacy of notated or fixed musical 
compositions or scripts.109 
 
VI. Functionality 
 
Works that have prominent functional features may be considered uncopyrightable in several 
jurisdictions (in the US this is known as the “useful article” doctrine).110 That works must not 
conform to some technical necessities is a requirement which is somehow related to originality. 
Indeed, any work whose relevant aspects are dictated by functionalities may at the same time 
lack originality. Where the work also meets the requirements for patent protection, this 
exception serves the important policy of keeping patent and copyright regimes separate by 
preventing creators and innovators from relying on copyright to obtain a “backdoor patent” on 
a functional article that cannot be patented (or whose patent protection has expired).111 Yet 
where artistic features are incorporated into a functional product (for example, a garment), 
these features are still eligible for protection in many countries subject to various conditions: 
in several jurisdictions – including the US – such artistic features are protectable provided that 
they are separable from the underlying product.112 
                                               
107 See Giuseppe Mazziotti, Music Improvisation and Copyright, in Non-Conventional Copyright – Do New and 
Atypical Works Deserve Protection 174 (E. Bonadio and N. Lucchi eds. 2018).  
108 See Trevor M. Gates, Providing Adequate Protection for Comedians’ Intellectual Creations: Examining 
Intellectual Property Norms and “Negative Spaces,” 93 Or. L. Rev. 801, 817 (2015). 
109 As far as jazz arrangements are concerned, see Mazziotti, supra note 88. 
110 For a recent analysis of this doctrine, especially as applied to designs, see Shubba Ghosh, Remapping Copyright 
Functionality: The Quixotic Search for a Unified Test for Severability for PGS Works, 39 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 
90 (2017) (exploring the dilemma in identifying an appropriate test for copyright functionality). 
111 See the US case Smith & Hawken, Ltd. v. Gardendance, Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1853 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
112 Under US copyright law the design of a “useful article” – namely an article with an “intrinsic utilitarian function 
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information– is not copyrightable unless it 
“incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article”: see 17 U.S.C. §101 (2007). In other countries 
requirements for protection of useful products seem less strict. In France, for example, it is accepted that an artistic 
expression should not be disqualified and deprived of copyright protection simply because it is fixed or embodied 
in a utilitarian article (this is the so-called theory of “unity of art”): see J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in 
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A wide variety of works can be affected by the functionality exception”. In the above 
mentioned British case Lucasfilm, for example, it was held that the stormtroopers’ helmets of 
Star Wars movie were not sculptures on the grounds that their purpose was primarily utilitarian, 
not artistic, namely to clothe the actors.113 Also, it is because of this exception that the selection, 
ordering, and arrangement of a Bikram yoga sequence was considered by a US court as a 
“process” for achieving good health, which precludes copyright protection.114 As the US 
Copyright Office also put it, “a selection, coordination, or arrangement of exercise movements, 
such as yoga poses, may be precluded from registration as a functional system or process in 
cases where the particular movements and the order in which they are to be performed are said 
to result in improvements in one’s health or physical or mental condition”.115 
But what about other sequences, such as movements in sports like ice dancing, figure skating, 
synchronised swimming, skateboarding, or even wrestling? Can these moves be considered as 
being developed for a purely aesthetic purpose, and not as attempts to directly increase the 
chances of prevailing in an athletic contest (in which case they would not be functional for 
copyright purposes)? The crucial question here is at what juncture sporting moves may become 
creative pieces in their own right and thus protectable as unique artistic expressions.116 
Generally speaking, ordinary sports moves are quite standardized, so they can be considered 
as commonly performed moves that serve a merely functional role in an athletic competition.117 
Yet some moves, especially in aesthetic sports, can be considered originally conceived, 
choreographed and designed “by an athlete for the purpose of celebrating his or her athletic 
feats”.118 For instance, a choreographic work of figure-skating with the incorporation of music 
and costume might be considered as not serving any functionality but sufficiently 
choreographic, creative and original to justify copyright protection.119 
Analogous issues are raised by other products of human ingenuity as diverse as food 
preparations, typefaces and graffiti lettering. 
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While one may consider recipes as functional directions for achieving a result,120 many dishes 
and their visual appearance may also be determined by creative expressions independent of 
most functional influences and possibly attract copyright.121 This may be particularly relevant 
in the US, especially after the Supreme Court ruling in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands,122 
which held that the pictorial and graphics features of cheerleaders’ uniforms could be applied 
to other medium and therefore could be protected by copyright: as has been noted, also culinary 
presentations that present artistic qualities independent of any functionality might now get the 
same protection.123 
What about typefaces? First, typefaces can be defined as sets of letters and numbers which are 
all in the same graphic style and are used in printing. What’s noteworthy is that under US law 
typefaces are not copyrightable.124 The reason for that is that they perform the function of 
building blocks of language and their aesthetic element cannot be conceptually separated from 
their functional element, which in this case is to graphically represent a letter of the alphabet. 
The lack of copyright protection for typefaces in the US has been criticised, though. Typeface 
designers may indeed exercise significant creativity and come up with highly artistic letters. 125 
And this can occur despite the constraints of the design process, which does not just dictate the 
function of creating letters, but also leaves room for a significant dose of artistic genius. Making 
copyright available for such non-functional aspects of the letter, therefore, does not seem 
revolutionary.126 After all, typefaces are considered copyrightable in countries like UK.127 
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As typefaces, also letters painted by graffiti writers have often strong non-functional and 
artistic elements, which go beyond serving the neutral function of representing the letters 
themselves. Such artists develop and practice their style by individualising and transforming 
the alphabet, frequently making the letters and the entire word unreadable to people outside 
their artistic subculture. Basically, what writers paint and draw are not just letters; they are 
often creative image-based interpretations of the letters. It has been argued that copyright 
should be made available when the graffiti lettering does not only consist of alphanumeric 
elements, but it is also elaborate, personalized and extravagant enough to be perceived and 
appreciated as an artistic endeavour.128 
Another category of works that may raise functionality-related issues are tricks performed by 
magicians. One may note that such tricks are functional methods and systems for creating the 
illusions, and therefore not protectable by copyright. What for example about a device that 
merely appears to cut a person in half? Is this device “useful” when its only use is to entertain 
and create an illusion as well as evoke emotions?129 As has been suggested, “a device that 
portrays a saw capable of cutting someone in half but that doesn’t actually do so is probably 
not utilitarian as a saw”. 130 Indeed, the primary usefulness or utilitarian function of a magic 
device is, in fact, to entertain an audience by creating the illusion, and the fact that a work is 
“useful” to entertain or to evoke emotion – the argument goes –  does not make it a “useful 
article”.131 After all, in Teller v Dogge a US court accorded copyright protection to a single 
illusion as a “dramatic pantomime”.132 In that case, the famous magician Raymond Joseph 
Teller filed a copyright suit against Gerard Dogge, a Dutch colleague who had uploaded on 
YouTube videos of himself performing Teller’s performance of “Shadows”. The court found 
that the two works were “nearly identical twins”.133 Because Teller provided persuasive 
evidence that he owned an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium and that the 
defendant copied original elements of Teller’s “Shadows” performance, the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Teller for copyright infringement. 
And what about scents and tastes? Could it be argued that “feelings equal functions” and 
therefore scents and tastes are not copyrightable?134 While French case law eventually denied 
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copyright protection for perfumes,135 the Dutch Supreme Court found that scents are 
perceptible by humans, capable of having their own and original character and thus being able 
to attract copyright: 136 no issue of functionality was found by the court in that case. 
 
VII. Authorship 
 
The concept of authorship is relevant in copyright law, as without an author there cannot 
evidently be a copyrightable work. While the Berne Convention determines the minimum 
protections to be granted by countries to the works of their authors, it leaves states free to 
interpret the concept of authorship - and many copyright acts still do not provide a definition 
of authors.137 Indeed, few judicial decisions address what authorship means, and who an author 
is.138 In the US, for example, the Supreme Court has defined an author as “he to whom anything 
owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.139 Lower 
courts have also noted that an author must be more than one who contributes creativity or 
originality to a work;140 basically, it must be one “who superintended the whole work, the 
‘master mind”.141 In other words, authorship could be defined as a requirement that no creation 
that does not entail at least some degree of human intervention is eligible for copyright 
protection. 
One may therefore legitimately doubt whether works produced without a predominant human 
“touch” can be considered protectable. Let us think about works such as a stylish living garden 
which grows by itself. This was actually one of the main issues in the already mentioned Kelley 
v Chicago Park District, 142 where the court found that the garden Wildflower Works “lacks the 
kind of authorship … normally required to support copyright.”143 The judge stressed that the 
artwork in question owed its existing form to nature: “Most of what we see and experience in 
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a garden - the colors, shapes, textures, and scents of the plants - originates in nature, not in the 
mind of the gardener.”144 
Certain legal literature has also contributed to a renewed scholarly interest in whether 
engineered DNA sequences could be considered copyrightable.145 Obviously, one may note 
that this subject matter does not satisfy the authorship requirement as genetic information 
(again) predominantly owes its creation to the forces of nature. In other words, what could be 
argued is that engineered DNA sequences are essentially derived from a natural source, so that 
it could be difficult for copyright judges and officers to identify the author.146 Yet, looking 
more closely into the everyday practice of biotechnologists and in particular genetic engineers 
is quite revealing. Products of synthetic biology, for example, involve the design and creation 
of “new, human-designed DNA sequences”.147 More specifically, synthetic biologists design 
and construct artificial biological systems that do not currently exist in nature, by writing DNA 
sequences that instruct a cell and engineering organisms so as they can behave according to 
specific design specifications.148 It might thus be claimed that in these cases there is an author, 
and that such sequences can be effectively deemed as original works of authorship.149  
Works created by animals (for instance, the sound of toads or frogs) are also relevant here. A 
US case which has attracted scholarly and media attention has dealt with whether an animal 
can be considered as a copyright holder. A macaque monkey had used a camera belonging to 
British photographer David Slater in Indonesia to take a selfie, which then became famous 
worldwide. The judge dismissed the argument brought by the plaintiff - an animal rights 
organization150 - that had filed a lawsuit requesting that the monkey be assigned the 
copyright.151 The argument was that US copyright law does not prohibit an animal from owning 
copyright. Yet, such argument was rejected by the court which held that while the animal had 
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constitutional standing it “lacked statutory standing to claim copyright infringement of 
photographs.”152 
The issue of authorship and ownership of copyright in works created by non-humans is not 
limited to artworks created by animals; and the debate around the required degree of human 
intervention in a work is not novel in copyright law. As far as computer-produced works are 
concerned, for instance, Australian courts have often been reluctant to affirm copyright 
subsistence due to a focus on requiring a human author (in other countries such as UK, Ireland 
and New Zealand, these works do attract copyright instead, with the author being considered 
the person that has made the arrangement necessary to produce the work).153 This debate has 
recently been revamped in light of the rise of creations made by machines and robots without 
substantial human involvement: here the focus is not on whether “computers are enabling 
people” to create works, but on whether “people are enabling computers” to do that.154 
Artificial intelligence, along with ever-increasing computational capacity, may indeed turn 
computers into autonomous originators of works that in the old days only humans could come 
up with. Computers have proven to be credible generators of literary, artistic and scientific 
works, with no human creative intervention in the generative process,155 which has spurred 
debate as to who should be considered the author and consequently the copyright owner: the 
programmer or the user of the machine, or both at the same time? (probably the answer could 
be given just on a case-by-case basis, after measuring the amount of creative activity made by 
either of them). Changes to copyright regimes may, therefore, be needed if these works are to 
be considered copyrightable: such changes may include relaxing the (human) authorship 
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requirement,156 which would probably sanction the evolution of the copyright system from the 
law of authors to the law of copyrightable works.157  
 
VIII. Ideas, Facts and Public Interest Concerns  
 
Copyright laws aim to balance the interests of those who create content, with the public interest 
in having the widest possible access to that content.158 They aim in particular at guaranteeing 
that certain subject matter and elements are not protected (and thus cannot be taken away from 
the public domain) because they need to remain available for, and usable by, anybody. Judges 
adjudicating copyright disputes might also be inclined to exclude from protection works that 
display an unlawful or immoral content, or that have been illegally produced. 
 
(i) Ideas and expressions 
 
A key copyright principle which aims at boosting the public domain is the dichotomy idea-
expression. It ensures that the manifestation of an idea is protected rather than the idea itself 
and therefore reconciles the interests of copyright owners with those of down-stream creators, 
users and the public at large, who can use and exploit non-copyrightable elements for their own 
purposes. While this principle is codified in US copyright law (“in no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea … [and] concept …”)159, in 
other few jurisdictions160 and in the TRIPS Agreement161 (the first international treaty to 
incorporate such a principle), in other countries including those with civil law traditions, it has 
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been developed through case law.162 In theory, the principle looks relatively easy to grasp. 163 
Yet, verifying in practice whether a specific element falls within either of these categories is 
definitely more difficult. The crucial question is: where does the idea stop and the expression 
start? This dilemma is particularly evident when it comes to certain forms of art and creativity 
where the line distinguishing ideas and expressions is rather blurred. For example, what about 
conceptual art, for which the concept behind the artwork is more important than the finished 
art object? And bio art, which is often (again) fundamentally conceptual and process-
focused?164 Or jokes, which seem to be based on merely funny ideas, but could also be 
personalised by comedians that change the arrangement of the words and perform them in a 
different style?165  
The often blurred line between ideas and expression is confirmed by the doctrines of “merger” 
and scènes à faire, that are sometimes referred to by courts (especially in the US). The merger 
doctrine argues that where the idea and expression are intrinsically connected, and the 
expression is indistinguishable from the idea because they have merged, such an element 
cannot be protected by copyright. The scènes à faire doctrine (literally meaning “scenes that 
must be done”) refers to elements that are standard, or indispensable in the type of work at 
issue or sequences of events that necessarily result from the choice of a setting or situation (in 
an old movie focusing on cops in the Bronx, for example, it is inevitable that the scenery would 
include drunk people, stripped cars, prostitutes, and rats;166 and in a spy movie we should 
expect to see secret agents hiding self-defence gadgets in their clothes). The rationale of both 
doctrines is clear. Granting the first comer monopolistic rights over these elements would 
significantly hinder the creation of follow-on works, and thus restrict the public’s enjoyment 
of further creative expressions.167  
That said, it is interesting to highlight how and to what extent these doctrines apply to certain 
works, such as jokes (again), magic tricks and sports moves. 
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Take magic tricks, first. In a US case involving a claim by a magician named Robert Rice, who 
had created a video called The Mystery Magician, the court not only noted that copyright does 
not protect the idea of revealing magic tricks; it also found that the sequence was merged with 
the idea of revealing the mysteries of magic and was a scènes à faire and thus unprotectable:168 
“there are only a finite number of ways to reveal the secrets behind magic tricks, and the 
perform and reveal sequence is the most logical expression of this idea.”169  
Other works which raise similar issues are jokes. Indeed, jokes often share similar punchlines. 
A punchline is the part of a joke which aims at making people laugh, and is positioned after 
the introductory framing and narrative. When punchlines draw on a stock theme that is 
common in the comedy circles, obviously copyright cannot be available. As has been noted, in 
case of a dispute a court may note that there is only a single way, or a limited number of ways, 
to express a particular fact or punchline, that the underlying idea has merged with the 
expression and thus conclude that the entire phrase of the joke cannot be protected.170 
Sports moves provide other examples where the merger doctrine may apply. Take scripted 
sports where (again) there is a limited number of ways to express an idea during a competition. 
For instance, in baseball and similar sports there are a limited number of routes a player can 
choose to get to a specific point. Similarly, in soccer there are just a limited number of ways to 
take penalties or perform bicycle kicks. Therefore, if copyright were secured on each play that 
would permit a player to perform that particular move, then he or she would basically have a 
monopoly over a scripted move which any other player should be able to take.171 This is exactly 
what the merger doctrine aims to prevent. After all, it would be rather difficult to imagine a 
situation where, for example, Zinedine Zidane would be allowed to claim copyright over his 
famous spin move and enforce it against other soccer players, asking them to pay royalties or 
damages! 
 
(ii) Facts 
 
Not only ideas. Facts cannot be copyrighted either. In Feist v. Rural172 the US Supreme Court 
confirmed that copyright can only apply to the creative aspects of a collection of data (namely, 
the creative choice of what data to include or exclude and the order and style in which the 
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information is presented), but not to the information itself.173 Many other jurisdictions have 
followed this approach, thus respecting the spirit of the Berne Convention which does not 
extend protection to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere 
items of press information.174 It is therefore understandable why several commentators have 
criticized recent legislative moves, for example by Germany and Spain, introducing a sui 
generis right to press publications that cover short snippets of news made available by news 
aggregators and web search engines.175 This approach is considered by many scholars as a too 
broad right which may end up covering facts such as news items and lead to an unwelcome 
monopolization of information and consequential restriction of free speech and competition.176 
What Mr Justice Laddie’s warned in his seminal article of 1996 “Copyright: Over-Strength, 
Over-Regulated, Over-Rated?” is quite relevant here: “We should not be handing out [the 
copyright] monopolies like confetti while muttering ‘this won’t hurt’”.177 
 
IX. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we have pointed to a varied range of new and non-conventional works and 
discussed whether copyright may be available to protect them. The subject matter we have 
covered is at times unusual, and even provocative. That is exactly what we want to do, namely 
to provoke and trigger a discussion. We are obviously aware that certain products of human 
ingenuity we have referred to here will probably never attract copyright, either because a judge 
or copyright officer has already confirmed so (e.g, yoga sequence) or common sense leads us 
to believe so (e.g. a spin move in soccer). Yet, a comprehensive analysis of such a wide 
spectrum of works, even those that will never be offered protection, may help understand the 
exact contours of copyright subsistence. 
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That said, it is safe to say that denying copyright just because works do not fit into any of the 
available boxes (especially in jurisdictions that have an open list system), or because the 
requirements for protection are rigid or are narrowly interpreted by judges, may often not do 
justice to people that put a significant amount of intellectual effort and come up with an artistic 
output. The British disputes Lucasfilm and Creation Records are good cases in point. This is 
not to say that any creation should be sufficient to justify copyright subsistence.178 There must 
be boundaries when it comes to defining copyrightable subject matter and assessing 
requirements for protection. As has been suggested, just productions of artistic creativity (with 
the concept of art including visual arts, music, literature and dance) should be offered 
protection, which would mean that no copyright would be available for subject matter 
protectable by patent law:179 although inventions are certainly products of human ingenuity 
and may be highly original, they definitely are not artistically creative.180 
One may also note that the decision whether or not to grant protection for a specific work 
should be based on whether such a choice would eventually promote the public interest and in 
particular the interests of users.181 For example, the introduction of a quasi-copyright protection 
scheme for publishers’ over short snippets of news made available by news aggregators may 
lead to the monopolisation of facts, which is hardly a positive outcome from a public and users’ 
interest perspective. 
Finally, we want to spend a few words on the so-called intellectual property negative space 
theory developed by some American scholars.182 Such theory argues that there are areas of 
human ingenuity where creation and innovation thrive without significant intellectual property 
protection. These areas include some works that have been analysed in this paper, such as 
graffiti, food recipes, comedy jokes and magic tricks. But is really copyright always 
unattractive to these categories of creators? If so, will this lack of interest in copyright last 
forever? Or could such creators instead acquire soon a strong interest in copyright, especially 
if and after their work has been imitated and exploited economically by someone without their 
                                               
178 See Antony R. Reese, supra note 38, at 118 
179 Id. at 122. 
180 Id. at 119. 
181 Users’ interests in copyright law have often been closely looked at by scholars. For recent perspectives see 
Christophe Geiger, Copyright as an Access Right, Securing Cultural Participation Through the Protection of 
Creators’ Interests. In What if We Could Reimagine Copyright? 73, 97 (R. Giblin and K. Weatherall eds. 2017) 
(stressing the need to introduce a sort of three-step test in order to obtain access to copyright protection and arguing 
for the centrality of copyright’s role in permitting access to culture through the recognition of both specific 
obligations for copyright holders and rights for users). 
182 See Karl Raustiala and Christopher Springman, The Knockoff Economy (2012); Elizabeth Rosenblatt, A 
Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 Colum. J.L. & Arts 317 (2011); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “Does IP Need 
IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 Cardozo Law Review 
1437 (2010); Kate Darling and Aaron Perzanowski, Creativity Without Law: Challenging the Assumptions of 
Intellectual Property (2017).  
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authorisation? After all, we have seen that some of these creators have recently started taking 
copyright-related actions against imitators. We, therefore, feel that copyright law may soon 
play a greater role in protecting these non-traditional works as well, particularly in situations 
where social norms or self-regulatory mechanisms - normally used in these creative 
communities - cannot govern as effectively outside the specific community as they do inside 
the community.183 Thus, the application of the IP negative space theory to several of the works 
highlighted in this paper may need be further tested in the not so distant future as more and 
more creators in the areas in question may soon nurture strong expectations of economic return 
and look for (copyright-focused) ways to protect their works and turn them into an even more 
profitable source of revenues. Leaving these new and non-conventional works in a grey area 
where just social norms apply may not pay full justice to the intellectual efforts put by a 
growing category of prolific and visionary people that seem to need rewards which only 
copyright regimes can offer. 
                                               
183 For an opposite opinion, with particular reference to comedy, see Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s 
No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up 
Comedy, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1787 (2008) (discussing how a norms-based system can be effective in the world of 
stand-up comedy, where there are no formal actions for the misappropriation of ideas). 
